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Introduction 
This paper reflects on the work of the Ministry 
of State for Development of Northern Kenya 
and other Arid Lands between its formation 
in April 2008 and the elections of March 2013. 
It is written by those with a first-hand (and 
therefore subjective) perspective on events1. 
Kenya’s arid and semi-arid lands (known 
as ‘ASALs’, highlighted on the map) have 
never enjoyed the kind of policy attention 
that takes account of their unique capacities 
and challenges. Pastoralism, the dominant 
production system in much of the region, 
has been especially misunderstood. Pastoral 
areas of Kenya differ from other parts of the 
country in three important respects: first, in 
the movement of livestock and people; second, 
in their demography (low population density 
and high population growth); and third, in 
their institutions (customary mechanisms 
for managing natural resources and security 
are still strong in many pastoral areas, and 
are the repository of invaluable indigenous 
knowledge). These differences are rarely 
accommodated in national policy or practice.
Northern Kenya has also endured a long 
history of marginalisation. Both the colonial and the post-
colonial administrations oscillated between neglect and 
abuse of the more remote parts of the north (Ochieng 
Odhiambo, 2002). Emergency powers in some areas 
were only lifted in 1992. Prolonged isolation and under-
investment has meant that the region has some of the 
lowest levels of human development in Kenya. In some 
northern counties adult literacy is below ten percent, 
net primary enrolment below thirty percent, and fewer 
than half of children receive all their recommended 
vaccinations.
The Ministry was created to address these challenges. 
It was most immediately a product of the National Accord 
which ended the post-election violence in early 2008 and 
ushered in the Grand Coalition Government. Agenda 4 of 
the National Accord, on long-term issues and solutions, 
drew an explicit link between inequality (with special 
mention of the ASALs) and sustainable peace. In April 
2008 President Mwai Kibaki announced a Minister for 
Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands as part of the new 
power-sharing cabinet.
More fundamentally, the Ministry was an outcome 
of the growing political strength of the people of the 
ASALs since the restoration of multi-partyism in 1992, 
and particularly since the 2002 election campaign 
(Livingstone, 2005). A number of individuals and 
organisations, in a network that flowed across state/
society boundaries, had been pressing for many years 
for a policy framework that was more attuned to ASAL 
realities. There was also a growing recognition, particularly 
in parts of government and the private sector, that the 
region’s economic potential had been overlooked. The 
ASAL Policy, approved by Parliament in December 
20122, represented the end of a decade-long struggle 
and was thus important for its symbolism as well as its 
content. Among other things the policy established an 
institutional framework to oversee its interpretation and 
implementation and provide dedicated and specialist 
attention to ASAL issues within government.
The policy documents produced by the Ministry 
recognise the important differences between and 
within Kenya’s arid and semi-arid areas in their culture, 
ecology, production system, development status and 
comparative advantage. The term ‘ASALs’ is common 
parlance in Kenya but is too imprecise for an area that 
now covers more than 80 percent of the country and 
is home to around 14 million people. Arguably, it has 
also been profoundly misleading in that it has narrowed 
policy attention to the different ecologies and their 
livelihood systems (pastoralism and others) rather than 
the comprehensive entitlements of citizenship. The term 
is used in this paper as convenient shorthand for the full 
scope of the Ministry’s geographical mandate. However, 
the paper’s emphasis is on the policy and institutional 
challenges facing pastoralism, since these are generally 
subject to greater misunderstanding and contestation 
in public policy debates.
There are four reasons for writing the paper. First, 
to promote continuity between administrations by 
summarising the Ministry’s progress thus far and the 
steps needed to sustain and advance the policy and 
institutional agenda which it has put in place. A new 
Cabinet has been constituted in the wake of the March 
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2013 elections with a different configuration of functions; 
responsibility for ASAL development now rests with the 
new Ministry of Devolution and Planning. Second, the 
allocation of a dedicated ministerial brief for drylands and 
for a marginalised region is unusual, and therefore this 
experience may be of wider interest. Published reflections 
by those involved in government are also less common 
than observations about government by external parties. 
Third, formal publication enhances public accountability, 
allowing scrutiny of the Ministry’s choices and actions. 
Finally, the authors hope to contribute to thinking and 
debate by those who may find themselves facing similar 
challenges in future.
The paper begins by summarising the historical, 
political and institutional contexts within which the 
Ministry was created, as well as the multiple narratives 
that have driven policy in Kenya’s drylands over time 
(section 1). Section 2 explains some of the policy choices 
the Ministry made in interpreting its mandate and 
shaping the policy agenda. Section 3 reflects on the 
response of different actors to the policy space opened 
up by the establishment of the Ministry, while section 
4 looks at how it implemented its mandate and its 
day-to-day engagement with others. Section 5 discusses 
the institutional framework in more detail and the steps 
required to strengthen it further. The paper concludes 
with reflections and recommendations.
1 Background to the 
creation of the Ministry
The creation of the Ministry was arguably a moment of 
serendipity, when a number of conditions in Kenya and 
beyond it coalesced in favour of change. These included 
a renewed focus on inequality in the wake of the 2007 
elections, a history of pastoral civil society activism and 
struggle which was gradually infiltrating competitive 
politics, the ongoing search for a new Constitution, the 
emergence of a discourse around resilience following the 
2008–2011 drought, and the choice of minister.
Since 1980 the government had tried various 
approaches in the ASALs but with little continuity and 
limited success (Annex 1). The justification for giving the 
region a separate ministerial brief in 2008 was primarily 
the growing political salience of inequality, including 
regional inequality. This had two drivers. First, sustained 
pressure by pastoralist advocacy networks since the 
1990s had gradually pushed the policy spotlight onto 
pastoralism and the political neglect of arid and pastoral 
areas3. Their efforts coincided with the emergence of 
the so-called ‘new thinking’ in pastoral development 
which validated the rationality and resilience of mobile 
pastoralism (Scoones, 1995; Niamir-Fuller, 1999). The 
main adversaries in the 2007 election found themselves 
obliged to respond to pressure from predominantly 
pastoral constituencies (which were also largely 
non-aligned and therefore a growing swing vote), such 
as promising action on livestock insurance.
Second, the shock of the post-election violence in 
2007–2008 moved the issue of equitable development 
further up the policy agenda. The signatories to Agenda 
4 of the National Accord made a commitment that: ‘In 
harmonizing our manifestoes, we shall ensure poverty 
alleviation and equitable development are top priorities 
for the Coalition Government’, with special attention 
being given to the most disadvantaged communities 
in the ASALs and in the urban informal settlements. 
The Ministry was created as part of this large coalition 
government in April 2008 to address, in the President’s 
words, the ‘unique challenges’ facing the region.
1.1 Historical marginalisation
The roots of these ‘unique challenges’ go back a long 
way, to the model of political economy adopted by 
the colonial regime. The railway line from Mombasa to 
Kisumu, built in the early twentieth century to facilitate 
the extraction of resources, became the geographical 
focus of investment to the detriment of areas further 
afield. The north – then called the Northern Frontier 
District (NFD) – was also governed under different and 
more authoritarian measures than the Kenya colony 
(Aukot, 2008; Hassan, 2008). Colonial administrators were 
given extensive powers of arbitrary arrest and collective 
punishment. Movement into and out of the area was 
tightly controlled. Containment rather than engagement 
was the priority (Ochieng Odhiambo, 2012).
The post-independence government maintained the 
same strategy, most ruthlessly in Somali areas affected 
by the secessionist Shifta rebellion where a state of 
emergency was only lifted in 1992. As the Prime Minister 
remarked in 2009, the north was just a hole in the map 
– quite literally, given that the first Demographic and 
Health Survey to include the whole country was as recent 
as 2003. All previous surveys had excluded close to 70 
percent of Kenya (the present-day counties of Turkana, 
Samburu, Isiolo, Marsabit, Mandera, Wajir and Garissa: 
CBS et al, 2004). The region’s prolonged isolation starved 
it of investment and led to the inequalities that are so 
evident today. Some illustrations of these are given in 
Annex 2.
There was also continuity between pre-and post-
independence administrations in the pattern of economic 
development and resource distribution. Sessional Paper 
No. 10 of 1965, the pre-eminent policy statement by the 
post-independence government, argued that public 
funds should be invested in areas where yields would 
be greater, in those with ‘abundant natural resources, 
good land and rainfall, transport and power facilities 
and people receptive to and active in development’. 
Thus the drier lowlands were dealt a double blow: 
their prior exclusion from development (‘transport and 
power facilities’) now classified them a poor return on 
investment, while the interpretation of ‘potential’ in agro-
ecological terms (‘good land and rainfall’) reinforced a 
presumption that highland crop farming must be more 
productive than lowland livestock farming. This has 
influenced the relative level of public investment enjoyed 
“When I took over the 
leadership of this country, 
I pledged to commit more 
resources for the 
development of the Arid 
and Semi-Arid areas... 
which have in the past 
suffered neglect due to 
inadequate resource 
provision and poor 
infrastructure. In the 
Cabinet I am announcing 
today, I have therefore 
created a new Ministry for 
the development of 
Northern Kenya and other 
Arid Lands in order to 
focus on and address the 
unique challenges facing 
these areas.”
H.E. Mwai Kibaki, 
13 April 2008
“Kenya has been defined 
by the railway line. The 
rest of the country was 
neglected; the NFD was 
just empty space on the 
map.”
Rt. Hon. Raila Odinga,
5 December 2009
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by these two livelihood systems ever since. While coffee 
farmers, for example, benefit from access roads, financial 
services, universal education, research expertise and 
the periodic write-off of their loans by the government, 
livestock farmers – and especially pastoralists – enjoy little 
of the same. These biases persist, despite research which 
demonstrates that livestock production contributes 
almost as much as crop production to agricultural GDP 
(Behnke and Muthami, 2011).
The state’s failure to provide these public goods in 
the ASALs added to the region’s challenges, turning the 
arguments of Sessional Paper No. 10 into a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Repeated cycles of crisis, driven by drought 
or conflict, inflicted on a population that was growing in 
both size and vulnerability, reinforced public perceptions 
of the region as a net consumer of national wealth and 
of pastoralism as unviable. On the contrary, the region’s 
history shows that its contemporary vulnerabilities are 
not the product of its ecology or production system but 
rather of conscious political choices taken in Kenya’s 
past. The fundamental challenge is a political one and 
concerns the chronic imbalance in power and resources 
between different parts of Kenya. This is what Agenda 
4, and subsequently the Constitution of Kenya 2010, 
recognised. It is why the Ministry was not called a ministry 
for ASALs, or for drylands, or for pastoralism – the phrase 
‘Northern Kenya’ in its title is a deliberate reference to 
the historical processes of exclusion and neglect which 
began in the NFD and still resonate today.
1.2 Policy narratives4
As the previous section suggests, two dominant 
narratives drove the government’s approach to the 
ASALs prior to the restoration of a multi-party political 
system in 1992. One was motivated by security concerns 
and the other by a belief that growth in the highlands 
would eventually trickle down to the drier lowlands. In 
the 1990s pastoral civil society began to counter these 
with a narrative of lamentation, articulating the injustice 
of the region’s condition.
The first public document that framed the ASALs 
from a perspective of potential rather than deficit was 
the Economic Recovery Strategy produced by the 
NARC government in 2003. By 2007, when the national 
development plan was published (Kenya Vision 2030), 
the ASALs were being talked of as the ‘new frontier’ 
for development, in part because of a perception that 
agricultural areas were reaching the limits of their 
productivity. The discourse was starting to shift in a 
more progressive direction but its application still 
raised concerns. Planners and bureaucrats within the 
agriculture and water sectors argued that the region’s 
economic potential would be best enhanced through 
modernisation, privatisation and sedentarisation – in 
effect making the drylands ‘more like us’. Meanwhile 
the language of the ‘new frontier’, often used by central 
planners, senior politicians and parts of the media, risked 
legitimising extraction, presenting ASAL resources as ripe 
for exploitation by either the state or private investors. 
There was very little appreciation in policy terms of 
the specific potential and particularities of pastoralism 
(rather than of livestock production), or acceptance of 
pastoralism on its own terms5. 
The Ministry’s position was that the ASALs are part and 
parcel of Kenya but that they have unique constraints and 
attributes which require greater nuance in public policy 
– a balance between diversity and unity. Government 
policy and practice should take account of what makes 
the ASALs unique without compromising on core 
principles of governance. For example, pastoralism 
should enjoy the same level of public investment as other 
production systems not just for instrumental reasons 
(such as boosting economic growth), but because it was 
the fair and right thing to do. Without it, the playing field 
on which the performance of different economies and 
livelihood systems is inevitably judged would never be 
level.
The Constitution of Kenya 2010 reinforces the ‘diversity 
in unity’ position. It attests to the common citizenship 
of all Kenyans but requires the state to respect diversity. 
The words ‘equality’, which affirms universal rights, and 
‘equity’, which recognises pre-existing inequalities, sit 
side-by-side in the national values and principles of 
governance. The Constitution goes further by creating 
mechanisms through which inequalities can be reduced6. 
It also addresses many of the Ministry’s early concerns 
about discriminatory laws and regulations that were the 
product of the region’s historical experience, making 
these in effect unconstitutional7.
Looking beyond Kenya, two other developments 
supported the more rights-based agenda of the Ministry. 
First, the African Union’s Policy Framework for Pastoralism 
in Africa (African Union, 2010) affirmed the Ministry’s 
position on pastoralism. When the ASAL Policy was tabled 
at Cabinet in 2012 it could be presented as clearly in line 
with a set of principles which the government had already 
endorsed. Second, the discourse around resilience, which 
became more prominent in the wake of the 2011 drought 
in the Horn of Africa, reinforced the Ministry’s arguments 
for equitable investment in public goods, and for a more 
appropriate balance between addressing the immediate 
manifestations of vulnerability and their underlying 
causes.
2 Making choices
Faced with a long list of expectations and demands, 
limited financial and technical resources, and the 
possibility that its life span might be limited to one 
term of government (given that the coalition was a 
temporary and expedient measure), the new Ministry had 
to make choices. It decided to prioritise systemic change, 
concentrating its efforts on measures to re-balance policy 
and institutional priorities in the long-term interests of 
the region.
To some extent this went against the grain. Most of 
the incentives within government in systems of planning, 
resource allocation and performance management 
favour the delivery of tangible projects. The public also 
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expects to see that its ministries are visible, their names 
on the sign-boards that claim patronage of clinics, 
schools and water points. However, the Ministry saw itself 
as a different kind of ministry, created not to duplicate 
or supplant the work of the main sectors (particularly 
those responsible for the provision of infrastructure and 
services) but to help them understand and become more 
responsive to the distinct needs of the region, their lack 
of responsiveness having been a key factor in its under-
development. Such an approach, it was felt, was more 
likely to deliver lasting change.
From its early days the Ministry saw itself as a time-
bound mechanism through which investment into the 
ASALs could be enhanced and directed in line with their 
particular circumstances and needs. The metaphor of an 
‘acceleration lane’ was used, helping the region ‘catch 
up’ with the rest of the country. The principle of being 
time-bound was rooted in a desire to avoid parallel 
development in the ASALs, for both philosophical 
and pragmatic reasons. First, the ASALs had a history 
of exclusion and differential treatment, as section 1 
explained, and were still too often perceived as somehow 
separate from the mainstream of national life. Second, it 
was neither appropriate nor practical for a single ministry 
to deliver on behalf of the government across such a 
large area. The only viable approach was for each sector 
to become more responsive to the needs of the region.
With this in mind, the Ministry decided to work in four 
ways.
1. Coordination. This was understood to mean the 
coordination of development policy, planning and 
resource allocation, both across government and 
with other stakeholders. It would involve more than 
the elimination of inefficiencies. The word most 
often used was ‘amplify’: the Ministry would ask 
each of its counterparts to reflect on the reasons for 
lack of progress in the ASALs in specific areas of their 
mandate. It would then use its specialist knowledge 
to help them achieve their goals. The trick would be 
to avoid getting drawn into the detailed business 
of delivery – most memorably expressed as ‘don’t 
pick up the shovel’ by one of the consultants who 
designed the institutional framework (Anderson 
and Kirira, 2009) – but rather to look for changes 
at a systemic level.
2. Selective implementation of programmes and 
projects. The important word was ‘selective’, i.e. not 
routine. The Ministry would implement projects that 
added value, by filling gaps in service provision or by 
piloting approaches that could be scaled up by the 
sectors. It would also implement programmes and 
projects that did not obviously fall within another 
ministry’s mandate, such as drought management.
3. Policy, legal and institutional reform. This would 
include the development of new policy and the 
review of existing policy in light of ASAL priorities, 
as well as the elimination of discriminatory laws, 
regulations and procedures and the creation of an 
ASAL institutional framework.
4. Regional interaction. Inter-governmental contact 
would be essential given that many ASAL counties 
lie along Kenya’s international borders, and given 
the frequent cross-border movement of pastoralists 
in both directions.
The Ministry’s successes and failures in each of these 
four areas are discussed in section 4.
Finally, in formulating its policy agenda the Ministry 
sought to re-frame the government’s approach to the 
ASALs using four key messages. First, that the ASALs 
are a region of untapped potential and opportunity, 
but that this potential will remain unrealised without 
accelerated investment in the enabling environment 
for development. Second, that the stabilisation and 
development of the region is a national priority and 
concern, of benefit not just to the region but to the nation 
as a whole. Third, that the citizens of the ASALs have the 
same rights to development as any others, but that these 
rights must be fulfilled in ways that take account of the 
region’s particular attributes and constraints. And finally, 
that the term ‘development’ means more than simply 
economic development, but is rather a deeper process 
of expanding people’s opportunities and freedoms.
The policy documents disaggregate the generic 
concept of ‘ASALs’ (illustrated in Figure 1), highlighting 
three broad priorities which have greater resonance in 
different parts of the region.
1. Inequality: actions to close the gap between 
the marginalised north and the rest of Kenya, 
particularly in public goods such as infrastructure, 
social services and security. These public goods 
are often referred to in Kenya as ‘foundations for 
development’, being prerequisites for economic 
growth, social justice and political stability8. Without 
these foundations, investors do not invest, public 
officers resist their postings to the region, the cost 
of doing business rises, and the prospect of stability 
falls. Without the infrastructure to access markets 
and economic opportunities, and without the 
services that build human capital, people lack the 
means to protect themselves against risk and build 
their resilience9.
2. Pastoralism:  Actions to improve the quality 
of service delivery and governance for mobile 
populations and those living in sparsely populated 
areas. The policy recognises that pastoral 
communities differ from others in their mobility, 
demography and institutional arrangements and 
requires that this diversity be accommodated in 
approaches to service delivery, devolution, the 
census and electoral practice.
3. Aridity: actions to strengthen climate resilience 
and sustainable livelihoods, and to reduce risk. 
In most semi-arid areas, whose place within the 
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nation is generally not questioned (either by 
their populations or by the state)10, the principal 
challenges are the deepening constraints on 
production in light of population growth, young 
people’s movement away from the land, and climate 
change. In the north and other pastoral areas these 
technical interventions are also important but will 
have little impact unless the other two priorities 
are also addressed. Across all the ASALs the policy 
authorises the establishment of mechanisms to 
manage climate risks.
3 Policy actors
While policy narratives were evolving in a more 
sympathetic direction, and the inadequacies of the state’s 
response in the ASALs becoming ever more apparent, the 
actual creation of the Ministry was unexpected. Arguably, 
it may not have happened without the crisis that followed 
the 2007 elections, since a large coalition government 
gave more latitude in the distribution of ministerial 
portfolios. A cabinet position for ASALs proved to be 
critical. Several civil servants in previous governments 
had tried to advance a more progressive ASAL agenda but 
were constrained by having to convince their minister. A 
cabinet position gives direct access not only to political 
decision-making at the highest levels but to contact with 
the most senior civil servants. This creates the space for 
alternative perspectives to counter more entrenched 
views (Keeley and Scoones, 2003).
The creation of the Ministry may be regarded as the 
opening of a ‘policy space’ (Grindle and Thomas, 1991; 
Cornwall and Coelho, 2006) – a time when ‘interventions 
or events throw up new opportunities, reconfiguring 
relationships between actors within these spaces or 
bringing in new actors, and opening up the possibilities 
of a shift in direction’ (Brock et al, 2001). Policy spaces have 
different forms and functions. One typology suggests 
five (KNOTS, 2006), namely conceptual (where new ideas 
are introduced into policy debates), bureaucratic (the 
formal policy-making process), invited (government-led 
consultations with selective stakeholder participation), 
popular (external pressure on policy-making) and 
practical (facilitating exposure for policy-makers to new 
approaches and ideas). The Ministry created space for 
most of these, and this section discusses how the various 
actors responded.
3.1 Public engagement and 
pastoral civil society
Between August and December 2008 the Ministry 
held a series of public forums across the ASALs. These 
built on earlier consultations around the draft ASAL 
policy (Annex 3). While the creation of the Ministry was 
widely welcomed, two responses were common in all 
these forums. First, some participants could only repeat 
the ‘narrative of lamentation’ referred to above. Perhaps 
understandably, long years of neglect had left part of 
the ASAL population unable to think of its relationship 
with government in anything other than passive 
terms. The second response was that the Ministry was 
nothing more than a token gesture – a ‘political creation’, 
something familiar to Kenyans who understand politics 
as an exercise in patronage.  The most frequently cited 
evidence in support of the second view was the small 
size of the Ministry’s budget, the argument being that if 
the government were serious about the ASALs it would 
have backed the new organisation with a budget to 
match. Costings prepared in 2006/07 for an earlier draft 
of the ASAL policy suggested that the region would need 
around Kshs. 30bn of investment per year for the next 
Figure 1: ASAL policy priorities by county
Policy priority
Counties in Northern 
Kenya
Turkana, West Pokot, 
Baringo (East), Samburu, 
Isiolo, Marsabit, Mandera, 
Wajir, Garissa, Tana River, 
Lamu
Other pastoral counties
Kajiado, Narok, Laikipia
Semi-arid counties
Kwale, Kilifi, Taita Taveta, 
Meru, Tharaka Nithi, Embu, 
Kitui, Makueni, Nyeri
Aridity: strengthening 
climate resilience and 
ensuring sustainable 
livelihoods.
• Institutionalisation and delivery of the drought management system
• Integration of climate adaptation & drought risk reduction into planning
• Land and natural resource management
Pastoralism: 
promoting pastoral 
mobility and 
institutional 
arrangements
• Service delivery (education, health, water) in ways 
appropriate for nomadic communities
• Cultural rights
Inequality: reducing 
inequality between the 
north and the rest of 
Kenya and 
strengthening national 
cohesion.
• Infrastructure
• Security
• Legal reform
• Social protection
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ten years11, sourced from the government, the private 
sector and development partners. The Ministry’s first 
development budget in 2008/09 was Kshs. 832m12, a 
large sum but modest by ministerial standards. Moreover, 
half of it was counterpart funding for a long-standing 
IDA-financed project that had been moved under the 
Ministry’s remit13.  A brief reflection on this budget debate 
highlights two issues of more general interest. The first 
is how the Ministry chose to interpret its mandate, 
particularly with regard to the rest of government, and 
the second is how the delivery of that mandate was 
affected as much by generic weaknesses in governance 
as by challenges peculiar to the region.
The size of a ministerial budget tends to be interpreted 
by both the public and political class alike as an indicator 
of ministerial power. In this respect Kenya is not alone: in 
most countries budgets are jealously guarded. However, 
the Ministry was more concerned with the level of 
resources allocated to the ASALs as a whole (not just its 
own budget), as well as the mechanisms to ensure that 
these allocations would be used to good effect. It would 
be unwise, it argued, to seek to appropriate the ASAL-
related budgets held by others: first, because as a young 
institution it had limited implementation capacity, but 
second, because it saw its strategic priority as being to 
help the rest of government meet its obligations in the 
ASALs, not usurp their functions. Territorial arguments 
about budgets would only antagonise colleagues with 
whom the Ministry wanted to engage. Moreover, a 
separate ministerial brief was arguably not in the best 
interests of a region long accustomed to differential 
treatment. The ASALs needed to be brought into the 
heart of government, not left on the margins.
The allocation of public finance to the ASALs did 
increase during the Ministry’s tenure. In the 2010/11 
budget, for example, Kshs. 13bn was allocated to seven 
ministries for projects in the region. However, budgets 
are allocated without mechanisms to ensure that funds 
actually reach the region and are used in a manner 
appropriate to its context. This touches on the second 
issue, of generic weaknesses in governance. The Ministry’s 
start-up budget was low partly because governments can 
find it hard to redistribute resources to new initiatives 
(Sutton, 1999, citing Crosby, 1996). In Kenya this is due 
to several factors, including a system of incremental 
budgeting, the political imperative of ‘equal treatment’, 
and a planning system which is inadequately informed by 
a comparative analysis of competing priorities. Further, 
weak systems of control allow individual bureaucrats to 
act autonomously and with impunity15. Even if budgets 
are allocated for a particular purpose, ministries may 
re-direct them to other ends without being held to 
account.
This highlights again why the Ministry attached 
such importance to the institutional framework and to 
mechanisms through which each part of government 
could be held more accountable for its commitments 
to the region. It also cautions against assuming that the 
constraints to progress in the ASALs lie only in things 
distinctive to the region (such as the biases against 
pastoralism held by some in the bureaucracy and political 
class). The ‘normal’ shortcomings of government also play 
their part16. For example, the nearly two-month hiatus 
in access to public funds as the financial year closes and 
then re-opens is a major impediment to timely drought 
response if environmental conditions worsen at the year’s 
end.
The Ministry’s response at the public consultations, 
both to those enthralled by history and those sceptical 
about the government’s intent, was to challenge them 
to think differently. First, marginalisation may be a 
reality but it was no longer a necessity; the means 
were gradually being put in place through which to 
reverse it. This argument was later greatly reinforced 
by the promulgation of a new Constitution in 2010, 
especially its Bill of Rights and the introduction of 
devolved governance. Second, a more progressive spin 
could be put on the Ministry as a ‘political creation’, in 
that the political system was responding to legitimate 
public pressure from pastoralists and others. Moreover, 
whatever the motivation behind its creation, the Ministry 
now existed and was an opportunity to exploit.
Other elements within the region were already 
thinking and acting along these lines. The Ministry formed 
a close partnership with the Pastoralist Shade Initiative, 
an emerging platform for the voices of pastoralists across 
Kenya, which tries to operate in a manner that draws on 
traditional methods of governance but adapts them to 
modern expectations (with women working alongside 
male elders, for example). As well as formal engagement17, 
there was frequent informal contact when members of 
the network would approach the Ministry for assistance, 
often to deal with outbreaks of inter-communal conflict. 
The Ministry’s open-door policy and its ability to channel 
concerns to counterpart ministries gave pastoralist elders 
direct access to senior levels of government. In this regard 
the members of Pastoralist Shade demonstrated a level 
of initiative, tenacity and energy that was often lacking 
among the more formally organised parts of civil society.
3.2 NGOs
The response of development NGOs to the policy 
space created by the Ministry was highly variable. Some 
recognised the shared agenda which had opened up 
and immediately came forward to support and take 
advantage of that opportunity; examples of some of 
these partnerships are listed in Table 1. Others continued 
to operate in parallel to government, with occasional, 
perfunctory contact. Both types of response were 
made by both international and Kenyan civil society 
organisations.
From the Ministry’s perspective, the more effective 
partnerships with NGOs, such as those in Table 1, had 
the following qualities in common:
• A will ingness to first ascertain the 
government’s policy priorities and then 
work with these, rather than bring a 
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pre-determined agenda to the table. There 
was a clear difference between the NGOs 
which saw the Ministry as simply a means 
to advance their own agendas and the 
NGOs which saw it as an opportunity to 
advance a broader public policy agenda. 
This also requires a willingness to subsume 
organisational brand and identity.
 
• A commitment to sustained rather than 
one-off engagement, with as much continuity 
of personnel as possible.
• A willingness to be challenged as much as 
to challenge, advocacy between civil society 
and government being a two-way process.
• The capacity to match dialogue with practical 
assistance (technical or financial) wherever 
possible.
• Recognition of the complementary functions 
of government and civil society. There were 
two significant shortcomings of parts of the 
NGO sector. First, a reluctance to accept that 
certain functions, such as security, education 
or social protection, remain the responsibility 
of the government and that NGOs can, and 
should, only ever play a subsidiary role. 
Second, a failure to be strategic about their 
comparative advantage, particularly in 
risk-taking and innovation which, if fruitful, 
can subsequently be taken to scale by 
government. Successful scale-up requires 
that the long-term institutional home for 
pilot activities be identified from the outset, in 
order to ensure maximum buy-in. This further 
reinforces the importance of sustained and 
early engagement by those NGOs wishing to 
influence government practice.
The kind of constructive partnerships illustrated in 
Table 1 require, on the part of government, a level of 
openness to the ideas and expertise of others, and, on 
the part of NGOs, a more nuanced political analysis of the 
state. The dominant narrative that characterises countries 
like Kenya, of states captured by their societies, their 
bureaucracies tainted by corruption and inefficiency – 
and which perhaps bolsters the instinctive preference 
of many NGOs for arms-length engagement, whether 
out of caution or a sense of moral superiority – arguably 
increases the obligation on non-state actors to keep 
testing the truth of that narrative and look for the policy 
spaces and like-minded individuals who are always there.
3.3 Development partners 
On the whole the Ministry enjoyed very constructive 
relationships with development partners, despite some 
early scepticism about whether or not the Ministry 
would ‘last’, and whether it had the necessary influence 
to engage effectively with what were seen as its more 
powerful counterparts. These views echo those of the 
public about what constitutes authority and influence 
within government.
Donor relationships were of three broad kinds. First, 
the ‘conventional’ western donors were at home with a 
ministerial mandate focused on poverty and inequality 
and with a minister who could speak their language. They 
also appreciated the strategic significance of the Ministry, 
despite its limited resources and uncertain future, and 
stepped forward with significant levels of development 
assistance. At times they also provided invaluable 
reinforcement of the Ministry’s agenda19.  The second 
group were governments in the Middle East and North 
Africa, as well as some independent organisations20, with 
cultural or religious ties to northern Kenya and therefore 
an emotional affinity with the region. This partnership 
involved both bilateral assistance in areas such as roads, 
energy and health, and philanthropic or community-
based activities such as higher education scholarships, 
voluntary medical missions and measures to advance 
basic rights and freedoms. The third group were countries 
looking to invest in the region, such as China, where the 
contact was of a more procedural kind and centred on 
specific contracts or projects.
Development partners’ contact with the Ministry 
tended to be led by their livelihoods, food security or 
climate change specialists, with far less engagement 
by those working on basic services, governance or 
Table 1: Examples of constructive engagement by civil society organisations
SOS Sahel UK and subsequently 
IIED
Technical assistance to the Minister’s office 
Long-term support on nomadic education, climate change and pastoralism
RECONCILE (Resource Conflict 
Institute)
Technical assistance in developing the Vision 2030 strategy
Facilitation of several public events for the Ministry and frequent dialogue on 
pastoralism
ELMT/RELPA18 Technical assistance in designing the Northern Kenya Investment Fund, deliv-
ered by Pipal Ltd
Funding for first consultative meeting with pastoralists
Capacity Kenya / Intrahealth 
International
Research on human resources for health
Provision of bursaries for health professionals from the region
Brookings Institution Research on education financing
Advocacy on equity in governance, particularly under devolution
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infrastructure; the former approached the Ministry, while 
the Ministry had to seek the latter out. Once again this 
illustrates the tendency to frame the ASALs primarily from 
the perspective of their production system and ecology, 
despite the fact that regional development necessarily 
touches on all aspects of life. While in theory livelihoods 
frameworks are comprehensive in their scope of analysis, 
in practice organisations allocate their resources against 
sectors.
The most consequential issue with which the Ministry 
had to deal was an audit of the Arid Lands Resource 
Management Project’s activities in 2006-08 by the 
World Bank’s Integrity Vice-Presidency (INT). The audit 
process had numerous shortcomings, including a lack of 
competence and professionalism on the part of INT, a lack 
of transparency on the part of the Bank, the Bank’s failure 
to deal adequately with criticism (which was interpreted 
as defensiveness), and INT’s reliance on complaints from 
a single, partisan source (whose private investigation INT 
then made use of, instead of working to verify the third 
party’s allegations). Worse still, poor management of the 
process hurt people in the region (by the withdrawal of 
drought contingency finance just at the moment when 
it was most needed) and damaged the prospects for its 
long-term development (by casting doubt, on dubious 
evidence, on whether locally managed development was 
indeed possible).
After two-and-a-half years of investigation INT was 
unable to produce any evidence of corruption, a fact 
which the Bank’s country director verbally admitted21. 
There were instances of shortcomings in ALRMP’s 
administrative procedures but none of these were of 
sufficient concern to justify the expense and disruption 
that had been caused. The Ministry chose not to acquiesce 
but to challenge both the process and its outcomes 
throughout. However, it did not make these criticisms 
public, which has allowed the Bank’s (and the original 
complainant’s) version of events to become erroneously 
established as truth22.
While the Bank’s management of the audit left much 
to be desired, the Ministry’s other main development 
partners, including DFID, Danida, the European Union, 
JICA and several UN agencies, all found creative ways to 
maintain their partnership through a difficult period to 
the satisfaction of both parties.
3.4 Parliament
The ASAL MPs were sympathetic and supportive of 
the Ministry. During the 10th Parliament (2008–2013) 
they numbered 74 out of the total membership of 224. 
Although an informal Pastoral Parliamentary Group 
had been established in 1998 and later reconstituted 
in 2003 (Livingstone, 2005), there was no formal ASAL 
grouping in parliament. At times it was clear how effective 
an organised alliance could be. For example, the debate 
that preceded parliament’s final approval of the revenue-
sharing formula on 27 November 2012 resulted in a higher 
allocation to arid counties than originally proposed, since 
their MPs pressed as a group for a greater weighting to 
be given to poverty in the final formula, and a lower 
weighting to population.
Despite well-publicised stories of the inappropriate 
use of MPs’ constituency development funds (CDF), it 
is important to remember that the CDF was the first 
public finance of any meaningful size to be systematically 
targeted on an ongoing basis to northern Kenya. In a 
situation of highly unequal access to the public purse, the 
CDF provided the kind of basic investment in things like 
classrooms and clinics which other parts of the country 
had long taken for granted.
The role of the 11th Parliament (2013 – ) will be even 
more significant given the enhanced powers of the 
national assembly over the executive, and the creation 
of the senate, whose purpose is to represent the interests 
of the new counties. Parliamentary committees will be 
instrumental in ensuring that the executive delivers on 
both the ASAL policy and constitutional commitments 
to marginalised communities. However, the Ministry’s 
experience was that NGOs interested in ASAL or pastoral 
advocacy had limited contact with parliament, and that 
this represented a major disconnect with the changing 
locus of political authority in Kenya23.
3.5 Researchers
The policy agenda of the Ministry was unashamedly 
political in that it sought to challenge a lack of fairness in 
the distribution of public resources and the biases that 
underpinned this. It had no intention of ‘depoliticising’ 
the process (Sutton, 1999). From empirical observation, 
the Ministry believed that the arid lands had been 
comparatively starved of appropriate public investment 
(and equally that they had for far too long been 
inappropriately subsidised with large amounts of relief 
aid, particularly food aid). In practice it was not always 
easy to support this with evidence, largely because of 
limitations in the way government data is recorded 
and analysed. These limitations were perhaps a further 
illustration of how previous governments had felt little 
need to accommodate the specificities of the ASALs in 
their operating systems.
First, ‘arid’ or ‘semi-arid’ are not terms used to identify 
government spend. Second, records kept by line 
ministries do not adequately record the geographical 
distribution of resources; their data may also contradict 
that kept by local officials. Third, the dominant unit of 
analysis until recently has been the province, which 
combined both arid and non-arid areas. In 2009 the 
Ministry commissioned a status report of the region 
from the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and 
Analysis (KIPPRA), but the work was severely limited by 
these constraints. In the following year the Prime Minister 
required line ministries to provide his office with ASAL-
specific data on budgets and activities; very few could do 
so with accuracy. For these reasons the approved ASAL 
policy requires that allocations to the region be identified 
as such and ring-fenced.
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However, some evidence did exist, and wherever 
possible the Ministry used sources validated by 
government24. Where data was not easily available, it 
commissioned research to find it, such as the studies 
by the Brookings Institution on the use of the education 
budget (Watkins and Alemayehu, 2012), and by Capacity 
Kenya/Intrahealth International on the allocation of 
human resources in the health sector (MDNKOAL and 
IntraHealth International, 2012). Both re-analysed existing 
data in ways which drew out regional inequalities and 
vulnerabilities otherwise hidden by the system. Powerful 
graphics helped to convey the extent of inequality and 
provided material which the Ministry could then use in its 
own presentations. Both studies have been instrumental 
in advancing policy thinking within their respective 
sectors. Research commissioned by other organisations, 
such as that by DFID on the economics of early response 
(Fitzgibbon, 2012), also helped to build a case, particularly 
if its authors had been able to analyse public expenditure 
in adequate depth.
The Ministry also sought ways through which 
pastoralists’ voices could be heard by decision-makers 
in a more direct way. One example was a series of 
consultations with pastoralist children and parents to 
capture their views on the education system, the video 
of which complemented a review of global approaches 
to the education of nomadic peoples (MDNKOAL and 
IIED, 2009; Krätli and Dyer, 2009). Both were presented 
to education policy-makers in a forum in January 2010.
3.6 Private sector
The Ministry’s contact with the private sector was a 
major area of weakness. This was despite the fact that 
some individuals within the private sector were the first 
to spot the significance of creating a ministry for the 
region. There are perhaps several reasons for this. First, 
there were few businesses and investors already active 
in the north for the reasons discussed in section 1, and 
therefore few potential partners already on the ground 
or with interests in the region. Second, private sector 
contact with government is generally mediated through 
the ministries responsible for trade or industrialisation, 
or in government/private sector roundtables which tend 
to take an aggregate view rather than focus on different 
parts of the country. The Ministry failed to make best use 
of these opportunities. Third, a pre-condition for private 
sector investment is public sector investment in the 
foundations for development, the limitations of which 
were discussed above. Although several international 
investors expressed interest in the livestock and farming 
sectors, none took further action once it was clear that 
an adequate transport, energy and communications 
infrastructure was still some years off.
Given the region’s unfavourable investment climate, 
the Ministry chose to prioritise the establishment of 
an investment fund dedicated to the region. This is 
described in more detail in section 5.
3.7 Individuals
The preceding paragraphs are inevitably something of a 
generalisation. The stance taken by each organisation was 
often determined by a particular individual; partnerships 
certainly waxed and waned as individuals entered and 
left office (especially country managers). As previously 
mentioned, the ASAL Policy was developed over a long 
period of time. A number of individuals made critical 
contributions during this period, both within and outside 
government. Individual MPs, researchers, activists, civil 
servants, donor representatives, consultants, and NGO 
staffers formed a loose network of people who shared 
the same commitment to the policy and more generally 
to advancing ASAL interests. This network meant that 
the Ministry could always draw on the support of allies 
within state and non-state agencies, within customary 
institutions and formal organisations, and across multiple 
sectors.
Inside the Ministry, individuals were also key. The 
appointment of a minister with a different profile – 
with less understanding of, and sympathy towards, 
pastoralism, or without such a wide circle of relevant 
contacts – would have led to different outcomes. 
Final approval of the policy document by Cabinet and 
Parliament was arguably in larger part the result of trust 
in his judgment rather than a forensic evaluation of its 
content25. 
Ministerial positions require the ability to juggle 
competing interests. The multiplicity of demands within 
government, from the constituency, parliament, the 
executive and cabinet, let alone those from external 
stakeholders, are such that it would be very easy to lose 
sight of the strategic agenda. To counter this, the Minister 
made a conscious effort to build a team around him who 
would help, in his words, keep him on track. His technical 
adviser, and a small group of civil servants specialised in 
different areas, came together to play this role and keep 
the Ministry linked to external sources of good practice 
and new ideas.
The experience of the Ministry does challenge 
the rather normative view of politicians in much of 
the literature. Interrogations of the motives of the 
powerful generally conclude that these are selfish. 
Cornwall & Coelho (2006) pose the rhetorical question: 
‘What incentives motivate [state officials] to invest in 
creating a more enabling environment and act in the 
interests of poorer and more marginalized citizens?’ 
Their answers are largely a mix of political expediency 
and self-interest. While the weight of experience might 
justify these views, it is surely reasonable to entertain 
the possibility of politicians motivated by something 
other than self-interest (Jones et al, 2013). And until 
political parties in states such as Kenya become stronger, 
ideological differences are generally going to be found at 
an individual rather than an institutional level. Chambers 
(2006) advocates win-win approaches and argues for a 
“How is it that for 45 years 
of  independence and 
self-rule, Kenya has never 
come to terms with what 
it really is geographically? 
How can a country expect 
to develop and tap its full 
potential and 
endowments while 
ignoring four-fifths of 
itself? Who authored the 
law at independence 
stipulating that for 
accelerated development, 
focus should be within 
only 50 kilometres 
distance of the railway 
line? Who said the richer 
part of Kenya is the one 
we have so far 
concentrated on?”
David Mataen, 
Corporate Finance 
Director, Faida 
Investment Bank, 
Business Daily, 
23 April 2008
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‘pedagogy of power’, noting that while there are manuals 
for working with the powerless, there are none for 
working with the powerful in order to transform power 
relations ‘from above’.
4 Policy engagement and 
reform
The term ‘policy’, in the context of this paper, is 
understood to mean not just the bureaucratic process 
of reaching consensus on a formal policy position but 
also the day-to-day interactions and activities which 
themselves convey policy positions. Both these are the 
subject of this chapter. 
The Ministry used four main strategies to challenge 
the assumptions and stereotypes which had driven past 
policy. First, it looked for strong evidence with which to 
underpin its arguments, as discussed in the preceding 
section. Second, it offered an alternative storyline – 
one that emphasised opportunity and potential where 
the dominant view of the region was still generally 
negative. For example, it presented northern Kenya 
as the gateway to growing markets in Ethiopia and 
South Sudan, and beyond them to the Gulf26.  Third, it 
repeated the same messages consistently both in public 
statements (speeches, presentations) and in private 
conversations until it started to hear the same language, 
anecdotes and examples being used by others. Fourth, 
it built partnerships with the like-minded, both within 
government and outside it; some examples of these were 
discussed in section 3.
This work was greatly helped by the fact that the wider 
policy environment in the country was so focused on 
reform. The political agenda in Kenya at the time was 
dominated by the process of constitutional reform, 
driven by an appreciation that Kenya’s institutions of 
governance were failing all its citizens, not just those 
in the arid lands. Further, the coalition government 
provided an unexpected degree of stability, in that it 
was politically difficult to unpick individual parts of it. 
The personal style of the President was also one which 
allowed his ministers a significant degree of latitude to 
implement their portfolios.
The Ministry’s official mandate was to provide policy 
direction and prioritisation of programmes across a wide 
range of thematic areas27. The list reflects the thinking of 
senior civil servants prior to the Ministry’s creation. The 
Ministry interpreted this mandate in four ways, as section 
2 explained, each of which is now discussed in turn.
4.1 Coordination: amplifying the 
work of government
The Ministry made limited progress in improving 
formal coordination28, but reasonable progress behind 
the scenes in its influence on various sectors. Its contact 
with each line ministry took place on different levels, 
including formal correspondence, face-to-face meetings 
with ministers and permanent secretaries, technical 
discussions between civil servants, public workshops, and 
corridor conversations at Cabinet; informal engagement 
was often effective. It was important to look for win-win 
solutions, to share the credit for successes and avoid 
partisan positioning. Progress was variable, stronger in 
some sectors than in others, and depended on things 
like its own technical competence and the interest of 
the counterpart ministers and permanent secretaries29. 
Now that formal ASAL coordination mechanisms have 
been approved, to be chaired at the highest level of 
government, the latitude which individuals can exercise 
should in theory reduce.
In the energy sector, for example, the combination of a 
sympathetic minister, regular breakfast meetings between 
ASAL MPs and the two ministers, and a mechanism for 
channelling finance (the Rural Electrification Fund) led to 
substantial progress. By June 2011 the Rural Electrification 
Authority had installed solar photovoltaic systems in 476 
schools and health centres in the ASALs, with funds to 
connect a further 380 facilities over the coming two 
years30. In the education and health sectors, progress 
was helped by clear and indisputable evidence of the 
problems31; competent and dedicated civil servants in the 
Ministry who built strong links with their counterparts; 
and, in the case of health, the transfer of the Ministry’s 
permanent secretary to the Ministry of Medical Services. 
By the end of the parliament the Ministry of Education 
had pushed forward with the establishment of a National 
Council for Nomadic Education (see also Box 2 below), 
while the ministries responsible for health were clearly 
moving resources to the north (such as funds to construct 
and staff a wide range of health facilities, of which there 
were previously very few) and disaggregating data to 
show their performance in arid areas32.
Progress in other sectors was slower. In roads, for 
example, the dominant view was that current traffic 
levels should determine investment; there was less 
appreciation that the provision of roads also creates 
strong economies33. This has since changed as a result 
of pressure from a variety of sources including the private 
sector, the media and IGAD, which all reinforced the 
Ministry’s argument that a better road network in the 
north was critical for regional connectivity, for accessing 
new markets, and to reduce hunger34. Nevertheless, 
progress on specific roads was glacial and required 
constant monitoring to ensure that commitments 
made by the National Highways Authority were being 
followed through. In the security sector there was 
strong engagement in the first two years, resulting 
in a progressive strategy to reduce inter-communal 
violence, developed by the two ministries, MPs and 
local leaders. However, the strategy was inadequately 
implemented. The imperative of containment rather than 
engagement runs deep within the security sector and 
proved impervious to change.
As well as bilateral contact with individual ministries, 
the Ministry used similar methods to try and influence 
how it (and by extension the ASALs) was perceived in 
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government. The default position of many policy-makers, 
not just within government, is still to view ASAL areas 
(and particularly pastoral areas) through the lens of their 
production system. Despite the Ministry’s clear multi-
sectoral mandate, in any process of national planning 
or budgeting it would generally be allocated to a 
working group for the agriculture sector, or possibly the 
economic pillar, but never to the social or political pillars35. 
This ignores the fact that ASAL citizens have multiple 
identities and needs beyond their roles as producers, and 
that these are becoming ever more salient as processes 
of diversification, commercialisation and sedentarisation 
change the landscape of economic activity and social 
identity in the ASALs (Catley et al, eds, 2013).
4.2 Projects: value addition to the 
sectors
While the Ministry avoided encroaching on the 
mandate of the line ministries, and while its priority 
was systemic change, it did have a modest budget for 
activities which it used in three ways: to fill gaps not met 
by the ministries, to pilot new approaches which the 
sectors could scale up, and to work on issues which were 
not being addressed by other parts of government, such 
as drought management or attitudinal change.
The ‘gap-filling’ projects were all carried out in 
partnership with the relevant line ministry in areas of 
water, health, education and planning. The latter included 
projects to organise and fund integrated spatial plans for 
Mandera and Wajir towns and lay the foundations for a 
spatial planning policy for the region. Urban centres in 
arid areas are growing rapidly and haphazardly, while 
spatial planning models are informed by conditions in 
the densely populated agrarian highlands and therefore 
less useful in the lower-density drylands.
There was less success in the other two categories. 
Testing new approaches required access to technical, 
financial and managerial resources which were generally 
not available. The most important activity which the 
Ministry wanted to take on was a campaign to change 
the attitudes and ‘mental models’ which underpin policy 
towards the region. Numerous myths and misconceptions 
about pastoralism and the drylands lie at the root of 
the narratives discussed in section 1 (Swift, 2003; UNDP/
UNCCD, 2011). The widespread ideological preference 
for ‘greening’ the arid lands comes from a mind-set 
that seeks to turn them into something they are not, 
rather than accept them for what they are. In 2009 the 
Ministry outlined a project it called ‘One Kenya’ which, 
through a variety of approaches and partnerships, would 
strengthen interaction between Kenyans in different 
parts of the country and challenge the attitudes held 
on both ‘sides’ – i.e. the negative attitudes often held by 
other Kenyans towards the north in particular, and the 
feelings of separation and inferiority which persist among 
those in the north. There were no resources to follow 
through on an initial stakeholder event. The Ministry 
hoped that the National Commission on Integration 
and Cohesion, established in 2008 in the aftermath of 
the post-election violence, might pick up the baton, but 
this did not happen. The justification for the project is 
still relevant, however, and could perhaps be followed 
up by others.
4.3 Policy, legal and institutional 
reform: changing the rules of 
the game
Section 1 described how the promulgation of the 
Constitution took care of overdue legal reforms. The 
institutional framework is the subject of section 5. This 
section discusses both the formal and informal processes 
of policy formulation and engagement, as well as the 
Ministry’s work on the Constitution.
The search for a national policy framework more 
attuned to ASAL realities (Box 1) started in 2003; Annex 
3 contains a timeline of the process. By the end of the 
government’s term in March 2013 the Ministry had 
published and launched three policy documents, each 
with a different purpose (Table 2).
Early drafts of the ASAL policy under the previous 
government had tended to focus on food security, 
giving prominence to issues of production and the 
factors on which this depended (such as natural 
resource management). Input was generally limited 
to the agriculture sector ministries which prioritised 
technical interventions and measures to minimise risk36. 
The Ministry expanded the scope of the policy process 
by involving a wider range of sectors and by giving it a 
more political bent, putting the social, cultural, legal and 
institutional impediments to development on the table 
as well (such as the attitudes and biases discussed in the 
preceding section)37. 
Box 1: Some characteristics of Kenya’s arid 
and pastoral areas
1. Remote from the centre of economic and 
political power in Kenya, with rudimentary 
transport, energy and communications systems.
2. Dispersed population, scattered across large 
areas of land in relatively small settlements.
3. Distinct livelihood system (pastoralism) requiring 
the mobility of livestock and people.
4. Social system places a premium on communal 
patterns of decision-making and ownership. 
Customary institutions still play an important 
role in security and the management of both 
natural resources and indigenous knowledge.
5. Environment prone to cyclical drought and the 
impacts of climate change.
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The tendency in government is to seek uniformity, 
which is why a more nuanced policy response for 
a particular region such as the ASALs proved so 
problematic. Most policy documents do now include a 
separate section or chapter on the ASALs. While on the 
one hand this may be welcome recognition of the specific 
and separate measures which the region requires, on 
the other it may suggest that they are still being treated 
as an afterthought rather than an intrinsic part of each 
sector’s analysis.
Uniformity is also a feature of the systems and 
procedures through which government operates. The 
allocation of recurrent budgets is one example, whereby 
an officer in Marsabit will receive the same monthly 
allocation for fuel and vehicle repairs as an officer in 
Muranga, regardless of the fact that Muranga would 
fit into Marsabit 28 times over38, and regardless of the 
wide disparities in their infrastructure and population 
distribution. Box 2 shows how the Ministry of Education 
changed its resource allocation systems to prioritise the 
north, and gives other examples of policy changes in 
the education sector that resulted from its interaction 
with the Ministry.
Research by the Brookings Institution (Watkins and 
Alemayehu, 2012) revealed how a system that on the 
surface seems logical and fair actually conceals deep 
inequalities. Kenya’s system of per capita pupil grants, 
based on the numbers of children in school, discriminates 
against counties with low enrolment. The budget share 
of Turkana county, for example, is less than 40 percent of 
the county’s share of the primary school-age population 
and less than one-third of its share of the secondary 
school-age population, because many children in this 
predominantly pastoral county are out of school. Were 
these per capita grants to be allocated based on the 
numbers of children, rather than the numbers of children 
in school, counties with large out-of-school populations 
could use the additional funds to provide alternatives to 
a school-based system.
The Ministry’s work on the Constitution was driven by 
the need for both policy-makers and people in the ASALs 
to appreciate the distinct opportunities and challenges 
which the Constitution offered for the region. A series 
Table 2: ASAL policy documents
Title National Policy for the 
Sustainable Development of 
Northern Kenya and other 
Arid Lands, Sessional Paper 
No. 8 of 2012 (RoK 2012a)
Vision 2030 Development 
Strategy for Northern Kenya 
and other Arid Lands (RoK 
2012b)
Ending Drought Emergencies 
in Kenya: Medium-Term Plan 
(RoK 2012c)
Status: Approved by Cabinet, 11 
October 2012
Passed by Parliament, 6 
December 2012
Endorsed by the Ministry of 
State for Planning, National 
Development and Vision 
2030, 16 August 2011
Original framework approved 
by Cabinet, 11 October 2012
Purpose: To re-frame the Government’s 
approach to the ASALs, as a 
region of potential, not just 
challenge, where 
Government will think and 
act differently by taking its 
unique characteristics into 
account, but whose citizens 
are entitled to the same basic 
rights in development as 
other parts of the country.
To complement and deepen 
the national development 
plan by showing how it can 
be realised in the context of 
the region, and to integrate 
ASAL priorities into national 
development policy and 
planning.
To show how Kenya will end 
drought emergencies within 
ten years. The document 
represents the first five-year 
plan for implementing the 
Vision 2030 strategy.
Box 2: Examples of changes in the education 
system in response to ASAL concerns
In 2012 a vehicle containing the Director in charge 
of Field Services in the Ministry of Education (MoE), 
and the Permanent Secretary and Director of 
Human Capital Development from the Ministry, got 
stuck near Loiyangalani where the passengers spent 
a night in the bush. Since then, MoE vehicles are 
allocated as a priority to education officers in the 
north. Loiyangalani was also the first beneficiary 
when the MoE received new vehicles recently.
Some secondary schools in the north have now 
been upgraded to the status of ‘national’ schools. 
Their new status brings additional funding and 
resources. National schools admit students from the 
whole country, but were previously only found in 
non-ASAL areas.
The Basic Education Act 2012 recognises madrassas 
for the first time and proposes to integrate them 
with the school curriculum.
In early 2013 the Ministry of Education announced a 
review of its free primary and secondary education 
programmes, including the system of capitation 
grants which discriminates against out-of-school 
children. Free secondary education is only available 
in day schools, which are scarce in the north.
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of forums for political leaders, other professionals and 
elders, cascaded from the national level to the county, 
were organised to highlight two things: the importance 
of leadership motivated by developmental goals, and the 
special needs of the ASALs which would require attention 
during the process of constitutional implementation. 
Discussions during these forums focused on the generally 
low levels of institutional capacity in many arid and 
pastoral counties39, the threats to devolution posed by 
clan-based politics, and the particular challenges facing 
women leadership aspirants in cultures where female 
public roles are severely circumscribed and female 
literacy levels low. While it is difficult to evaluate the 
impact of these forums, there is anecdotal evidence 
that they influenced the way some counties prepared 
themselves for the 2013 elections. The Brookings 
Institution research on education financing discussed 
above, and the willingness of its authors to communicate 
their findings in repeated public events, also influenced 
debates about revenue allocation under a devolved 
system.
4.4 Regional interaction
Stability and progress in Kenya’s border counties will 
not be achieved without stability and progress among 
their neighbours. Pastoralists are natural pan-Africans; 
their movement into adjacent countries is an important 
productive strategy to be protected and promoted. The 
potential of cross-border trade and investment, and the 
risks from cross-border insecurity, require harmonised 
policy approaches between governments. These were 
the considerations behind this fourth area of work.
However, it was something of a poor relation. Both 
the Minister and Assistant Minister took part in cross-
border peace meetings from time to time, alongside 
other political leaders, and the Ministry participated in 
relevant inter-governmental delegations. But there was 
no structured and funded process of interaction between 
regional governments on issues specific to the arid lands. 
Nor was this work an explicit part of the Ministry’s formal 
mandate. Moreover, ministerial mandates in each country 
differed. The IGAD initiative on drought resilience40, which 
emerged in the wake of a summit of heads of state and 
government in the Horn of Africa in September 2011, 
has provided a framework for periodic contact but not 
(yet) for strengthening policy harmonisation between 
countries.
5 Institutional framework
Previous studies on the ASALs have noted that the 
quality of a policy document is rarely matched by the 
quality of its implementation (Moris, 1999). Despite 
efforts to strengthen performance management in 
Kenya, accountability for the implementation of policy 
remains highly variable across government. This is a 
particular concern for any issue, such as pastoralism, 
which cuts across the deeply ingrained architecture of 
autonomous sectors within which both governments 
and the aid system organise their work, and which 
requires action to be taken by those sectors. People 
do not compartmentalise their lives in the way that 
governments and donors tend to do, and therefore 
mechanisms are needed to ensure that group-based 
concerns, such as ASAL development, are adequately 
addressed by the sector-based structure of government.
Over and above this general challenge, there are 
reasons why coordination and institutional capacity 
matter in the ASALs in particular, and why the Ministry 
prioritised mechanisms to strengthen policy delivery. 
First, the costs of doing business in the region are high, 
given its size and poor infrastructure, and therefore the 
way in which resources are directed matters even more. 
Second, poor coordination, such as badly sited water 
infrastructure or conflict-insensitive projects, can be 
severely destabilising. Third, the institutional capacity 
to coordinate is often weaker in arid areas given their 
remoteness, operating constraints, and limited human 
resources. Fourth, meaningful public participation in 
the political process is harder for populations who are 
mobile, remote, less literate and coping with chronic 
hardship. Finally, the inflexible frameworks and timelines 
of centrally driven planning and budgeting systems make 
them less effective in environments such as drylands 
where variability is high.
A final consideration was continuity. There was a strong 
possibility that the Ministry might not continue beyond 
its first five-year term. What is striking about the history 
of ASAL development in Kenya is how little institutional 
continuity there has been (Annex 1). The Ministry of 
Reclamation and Development of Arid, Semi-Arid and 
Wastelands had barely established itself in 1989 before it 
was subsumed into another ministry. And although the 
Arid Lands Resource Management Project had a long 
life, it was moved between three different ministries 
during that time. Each new institution takes at least a 
year or two to negotiate the bureaucracy and become 
fully operational; this is a significant proportion of a five-
year government term. Given that reversing decades of 
neglect is bound to take time, it is hardly surprising that 
there has been so little apparent progress in the ASALs 
when there has been no chance to sustain a consistent 
and coherent approach. For these reasons the Ministry 
looked to establish permanent institutions, such as state 
corporations, which are less vulnerable to ministerial 
restructuring. The institutional framework developed 
by the Ministry and approved in the ASAL policy has 
four elements shown in Figure 2.
The framework combines the twin imperatives of 
mainstreaming and specialism. On the one hand, arid 
and pastoral areas, like any others in Kenya, should be 
the responsibility of the main line ministries and fully 
integrated within sector plans and budgets. On the 
other hand, arid and pastoral areas have distinct needs 
which have hitherto been ignored, and need champions 
within the sectors until such time as changes in approach, 
attitudes and systems have been institutionalised.
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Table 3 lists the ASAL-focused organisations promoted 
by the Ministry and explains the status, justification 
and purpose of each. The first two will enhance the 
coordination and harmonisation of ASAL priorities across 
the sectors; the others will improve responsiveness to 
ASAL priorities within a particular sector. All of them are 
either just formed or in the final stages of design, and 
therefore the table also highlights some of the risks that 
lie ahead and strategies to mitigate these. Over and above 
all of them is the new ASAL Cabinet Sub-Committee.
Cabinet
oversight
1
3
4
Stakeholder
coordinaon
ASAL
Secretariat
2
Specialist
instuons
Figure 2: ASAL institutional framework
4. ASAL Secretariat, to support 
all these structures and ensure 
stronger integration of policies, 
institutions and practices for 
sustainable development in the 
ASALs.
3. Stakeholder coordination through 
the ASAL Stakeholder Forum (ASF), which 
provides a platform at both national 
and county levels for dialogue between 
government, UN agencies, development 
partners, NGOs, the private sector and 
ASAL citizens. The inaugural meeting of 
the ASF was held in July 2012.
2. Specialist institutions to ensure that the 
ASALs are given adequate attention within 
each sector. These include the National Drought 
Management Authority (and associated drought 
contingency fund), the National Council on 
Nomadic Education in Kenya, and the Livestock 
Marketing Board. They also include institutions 
outside government, including the Northern 
Kenya Education Trust and the Northern Kenya 
Investment Fund.
1. Cabinet oversight of the progress 
made across Government in delivering 
the ASAL Policy. An ASAL Cabinet 
Sub-Committee, chaired by the President 
or Deputy President and supported by an 
inter-ministerial committee of Principal 
Secretaries, will provide high-level policy 
direction and hold each sector to account.
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Table 3: ASAL-focused organisations – status, justification, purpose, risks and mitigating strategies
Organisation Status Justification and purpose Risks and mitigating strategies
1. ASAL 
Secretariat
Operational: 
provided for within 
the ASAL Policy but 
not yet formalised.
The ASAL Secretariat is the 
coordinating point for the 
whole ASAL agenda. Its role is 
to support each part of the 
ASAL institutional framework 
(including servicing the 
cabinet structures), to 
monitor delivery of the ASAL 
policy, and to promote policy 
coherence and harmonised 
action across the ASALs. 
Knowledge management is 
the basis of its work.
Given the strategic and 
multi-sectoral nature of its 
mandate, the optimum 
location for the ASAL 
Secretariat is in the institution 
responsible for coordinating 
government business.
As section 1 explained, the incentive in government is to be 
seen to ‘deliver’ – to have a large budget, large establishment, 
and high profile. In practice what are often required, 
particularly for a cross-cutting issue such as ASAL 
development, are the skills to facilitate, influence and 
collaborate, and the willingness to share both the credit and 
the blame for results.
The Secretariat operates at the centre of a complex web of 
actors, interests and concerns. It will need sustained and 
high-quality technical support from development partners 
to build up the capabilities needed to work effectively in 
such a context. It must also be fully institutionalised in 
government for maximum impact.
2. ASAL 
Stakeholder 
Forum (ASF)
Operational: 
inaugural meeting 
held in July 2012.
The ASF is a platform for 
dialogue at both the national 
and county levels between 
government, ASAL citizens 
and a wide variety of agencies 
(donors, researchers, inves-
tors, NGOs). Its role is to 
enhance networking and 
coordination, joint action and 
advocacy, and peer account-
ability. While there are 
structures that bring organi-
sations together within a 
particular sector or grouping, 
only the ASF provides a space 
where the full range of issues, 
interests and actors can come 
together.
The history of pastoral advocacy in Kenya has been marked 
by circular debates as individuals come and go – most 
notably on the viability and future of pastoralism. 
Conversations also tend to take place between the like-
minded. Members of the ASF need to find ways to settle 
debates and move on, so that they can become a more 
concerted force to challenge deep-seated biases and beliefs 
in wider Kenyan society towards the arid lands and 
pastoralism.
The diversity of the ASF’s membership, in the type and 
location of organisation and the issues that concern them, 
means that careful facilitation of the dynamics within the 
forum will be required.
3. National 
Drought 
Management 
Authority 
(NDMA)
Operational: State 
Corporation 
gazetted in 
November 2011.
Drought is a normal 
phenomenon in drylands, but 
failure to manage it well 
presents a major threat to the 
region and to national 
development. The NDMA will 
give permanent and specialist 
attention to these risks.
As a semi-autonomous state 
corporation, the NDMA enjoys 
greater stability, financial 
flexibility and protection from 
political pressure than 
projects or ministries. Its 
mandate gives it the powers 
to ensure harmonisation and 
adherence to quality 
standards by all actors. 
State corporations are often set up to generate efficiencies 
for the government. However, the NDMA is a different kind of 
parastatal in that it must deliver for the many stakeholders 
involved in drought management in Kenya as much as it 
does for the government. It is therefore even more 
incumbent on the Authority that its systems are robust and 
its staff competent.
Further, its mandate requires it to respond not just to each 
successive drought in turn (the ‘drought cycle’) but to the 
wider dimensions of vulnerability, particularly under climate 
change. This will require new skills, strategies and 
partnerships, as well as a willingness by the international 
humanitarian system and development actors to work 
differently (for example by eliminating parallel systems of 
early warning, planning and coordination).
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4. National 
Drought and 
Disaster 
Contingency 
Fund (NDDCF)
Pending: being 
established by the 
National Treasury.
Early response not only 
reduces suffering but in the 
long run is more cost-
effective. The NDDCF will 
provide the set-aside funds 
needed for early response 
and a mechanism through 
which new sources of risk 
finance (for example from 
climate funds or insurance) 
can be channelled.
The biggest risk facing the NDDCF is loss of trust; its 
governance must be above reproach. As a multi-donor trust 
fund it will have multiple stakeholders which must all have 
complete confidence in its systems. Strong governance will 
in turn attract a wider range of investors to the fund. 
5. Livestock 
Marketing 
Board (LMB)
Approved: 
provided for within 
the National 
Livestock Policy, 
2008, but not yet 
operational.
The livestock sector has not 
enjoyed the same degree of 
public support as other 
production systems, for 
example in research, 
marketing and financial 
services. In this respect the 
LMB is an equalising measure 
which will maximise the 
potential of the livestock 
sector.
State corporations in Kenya have had a very mixed track 
record; a few have been very effective, many others not so. 
The calibre of the board and senior staff will be key.
Experience in countries such as Somalia also shows how 
effective livestock marketing can be with no government 
oversight or support. The LMB will therefore need to define 
its role with care. Close collaboration with pastoral civil 
society, livestock traders and the cooperative movement will 
be key in order to identify the LMB’s comparative 
advantage41. 
6. National 
Council on 
Nomadic 
Education in 
Kenya 
(NACONEK)
Approved: 
provided for within 
the Basic Education 
Act, 2013, but not 
yet operational.
It is sometimes said that 
Kenya has a Ministry of 
Schools rather than a Ministry 
of Education. An education 
system that requires 
attendance at fixed schools 
forces nomadic families to 
make unreasonable choices 
between their culture and 
livelihood and the education 
of their children.
NACONEK will introduce 
educational approaches and 
methodologies which are 
more in sympathy with 
nomadic values and lifestyles.
In the passage of the Basic Education Act through 
parliament, the purpose of NACONEK was diluted by adding 
the word ‘marginalisation’ to the interpretation of its 
functions. The Ministry of Education and Council members 
should ensure that NACONEK retains its intended focus on 
the specific challenges posed by mobility. Partnerships with 
pastoral civil society and with the network of global 
specialists in nomadic education will help to ensure this.
7. Northern 
Kenya 
Education 
Trust (NoKET)
Operational: 
registered in 2010.
Given the limited access to 
education and training in arid 
and pastoral counties, NoKET 
gives bursaries at secondary 
and tertiary levels, with a bias 
towards girls, and advocates 
improvements in the 
education system and the 
mechanisms through which 
bursaries are targeted and 
provided.
NoKET is registered as an 
independent trust but has a 
Memorandum of 
Understanding with the 
Ministry of Education to 
guarantee a certain number 
of places in national schools 
for NoKET scholarship girls.
There are already many sources of bursary support in Kenya, 
and NoKET risks delivering only more of the same. It has two 
distinguishing features which extend its interests beyond 
that of its individual beneficiaries. First, its ultimate goal is to 
expand the pool of skilled professionals who can then 
support the region’s development; this should influence how 
it disburses its funds. Second, it aims to develop a 
harmonised mechanism for bursary support which ensures 
both cost-effectiveness and tighter targeting to the poorest 
families across all such schemes.
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6 Concluding remarks
The policy and institutional reforms described in this 
report are not yet widely known or understood. They are 
also at a fledgling stage and will need close follow-up 
and support. This section discusses some of the risks that 
may lie ahead, identifies lessons that may be applicable 
elsewhere, and makes recommendations to the various 
actors involved.
First, policy spaces close as well as open (Neilson, 
2001). The future context for ASAL development may 
be more or less conducive than it has been during the 
10th Parliament of 2008–2013. Individuals will change 
positions. Development partners may shift priorities. 
The ASAL agenda must compete for attention at a 
time of significant institutional change and uncertainty 
in Kenya. Devolution may impede or facilitate policy 
implementation. Contestation over resources may 
increase as the redistributive agenda of both the 
Constitution and the ASAL Policy becomes clearer. Under 
the Constitution, government ministers are no longer 
parliamentarians but technocrats; it remains to be seen 
whether that change will have any implications in terms 
of sustaining an overtly political agenda.
Second, change and continuity co-exist (Krznaric, 
2007). Some shifts have clearly taken place. Jones and 
Villar (2008) identify five possible dimensions of policy 
impact in the political debate and agenda; language 
and rhetoric; procedural change; policy content; and 
behaviour change. The Ministry arguably achieved 
some degree of change in the first four. Evidence of the 
fifth and most crucial (behaviour change) is as yet less 
obvious, or else has not yet had time to manifest itself, 
being a consequence of the other four. However, these 
changes are not being introduced onto a clean slate. The 
ASAL Policy is being superimposed on existing policy 
frameworks and public institutions and must find a way of 
percolating through them. Policy-makers are ‘inheritors 
before they are choosers’; new initiatives enter a policy 
environment ‘dense with past commitments’ (Rose, 1993). 
Formal passage of the document does not guarantee 
universal enthusiasm for, or even understanding of, its 
provisions. 
Third, bringing the ASALs further into the heart of 
government will present new dilemmas. As the region 
moves more prominently into the limelight it will 
become implicated in different processes and power 
struggles, attracting the attention of other actors and 
interests. Developments around land, extractives, 
investment and settlement are all likely to bring new 
challenges for pastoralism. The importance of the young 
ASAL institutions lies in the opportunity they offer for 
pastoralists and other ASAL citizens to participate in these 
debates on a more equal footing.
This report has provided a snapshot of a period of policy 
and institutional reform when the interplay of actors and 
their interests allowed certain narratives and priorities 
to come more prominently to the fore. The identities 
8. Northern 
Kenya 
Investment 
Fund (NKIF)
Pending: design 
work completed.
The NKIF will expand and 
incentivise private sector 
engagement in the region by 
providing businesses with the 
equity they are often unable 
to secure from financial 
service providers in Nairobi 
(who perceive the region as 
high risk).
The NKIF will be an impact 
investment fund, required to 
deliver both social/
environmental and financial 
returns. It will be a private 
sector facility, with an 
independent fund manager, 
but with linkages to the ASAL 
Secretariat which will, for 
example, facilitate its access 
to stakeholders in the region 
and negotiate appropriate 
incentives with the National 
Treasury and the county 
governments. Again, the NKIF 
is seen as an affirmative 
action measure until the 
financial services sector 
becomes more responsive to 
the region’s needs.
Private sector investment in the ASALs has often had 
negative consequences, such as the alienation of land, and 
has generally delivered few benefits to local communities. 
The NKIF is designed to provide not just financial returns but 
direct benefits for the region in terms of poverty reduction, 
employment and economic growth. The governance and 
management of the fund must keep sight of these twin 
objectives.
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and roles of these actors will now change. Some will 
occupy different positions, from which they will be able to 
maintain their support for ASAL priorities, while new ones 
have joined the scene: a number of professionals from 
both the private and the public sectors, well-respected in 
their fields, now occupy positions of authority within the 
county governments. The challenge now is to translate 
a network of individuals into a network of institutions 
that can sustain the process of policy reform and 
implementation that has been started. The extent to 
which this succeeds will depend on the extent to which 
individuals hold themselves accountable to the policy 
direction and institutional changes which Parliament 
has adopted.
Box 3 draws together some of the lessons identified in 
the course of this report which may be of wider relevance 
and interest.
Box 3: Lessons learned
1. A five-year term of government is far too short a time to have meaningful impact on the structural causes of 
chronic poverty and inequality. These are generational challenges which require continuity of approach and 
delivery between administrations. The focus should therefore be on establishing a permanent institutional 
framework which can provide this.
2. The finite nature of ministerial positions and the many competing demands on ministers highlight the 
importance of focus and prioritisation and of mechanisms that will help keep processes on track.
3. The openings for policy reform often develop in an unplanned way, often when a number of favourable 
conditions unexpectedly coincide. Constant monitoring of the policy environment, and the skills to 
recognise and capitalise on these opportunities when they arise, are essential for those wishing to influence 
policy either within government or outside it.
4. Policy change may involve framing an issue differently and offering an alternative narrative, as much as 
weighing up objective evidence and options. Evidence is, however, critical in generating legitimacy for the 
new narrative.
5. The long period of time over which the main ASAL policy document was developed was frustrating, but the 
successive consultative meetings which reached strikingly similar conclusions ensured that there was strong 
public consensus on the final policy priorities.
6. Many of the blockages to reform lie in the way in which development as a process is structured and 
organised. Discrete projects, sectors, and financial years are inadequate mechanisms to deal with the fluid 
and dynamic nature of change.
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Recommendations
The following recommendations to the various actors 
mentioned in this report focus on measures which will 
strengthen continuity and consolidation of the reform 
process as it continues to play out in the years to come.
Pastoral civil society:
• Build active partnerships with the new 
ASAL institutions, particularly the ASAL 
Stakeholder Forum, the Livestock Marketing 
Board, the NDMA and NACONEK, to ensure 
that pastoralists’ interests are front and centre 
in the agendas of these organisations.
• Play an active role in governance at the county 
level and ensure that county leaders act in 
accordance with constitutional principles. 
Parliament:
• Ensure that the Constitution’s principles 
and commitments are put into practice, 
particularly, for the ASALs, those concerning 
devolution, public finance, the Bill of Rights 
and affirmative action.
• Press for accountability from the executive 
in meeting the commitments set out in the 
ASAL policy documents, including the proper 
functioning of the institutional framework.
National government:
• Strengthen the emerging ASAL institutional 
framework and ensure sustained high-level 
engagement in the cabinet coordinating 
structures.
• Finalise the establishment of any pending 
organisations, specifically the National 
Drought and Disaster Contingency Fund, the 
Livestock Marketing Board and the National 
Council on Nomadic Education.
• Act on all commitments in the ASAL policy 
documents, particularly investments in the 
foundations for development.
County government:
• Engage with the emerging ASAL institutional 
framework and negotiate working modalities 
with relevant institutions, such as the NDMA.
• Use legislative and executive powers to 
protect and promote pastoralism at the local 
level, either independently or in collaboration 
with neighbouring counties.
Development partners
• Expand investment in the foundations for 
development, either directly through the 
sectors (roads, education, health, energy, ICT, 
security) or through dedicated institutions 
(such as the Livestock Marketing Board and 
NACONEK).
• Use new structures such as the ASAL 
Stakeholder Forum, ASAL Secretariat and 
ASAL donor group to continue improving 
alignment with the priorities set out in the 
ASAL policy documents.
• Provide technical assistance to the new 
ASAL institutions, including linkages to 
international good practice.
NGOs:
• Re-think advocacy strategies in light of the 
changing nature of political authority in 
Kenya, particularly the enhanced powers of 
parliament and the establishment of county 
governments.
• Re-think partnerships with government 
in order to reinforce the efforts of those 
pursuing a progressive agenda in the ASALs.
• Create space and support for pastoral civil 
society in its advocacy at both county and 
national levels.
Researchers:
• Continue helping build a strong evidence 
base for ASAL decision-making, addressing 
the current limitations in the data.
• Support  processes to monitor the 
consequences of change, both negative and 
positive, expected and unexpected.
Private sector:
• Participate actively in the ASAL Stakeholder 
Forum.
• Use round-table forums with government to 
press for investments in the foundations for 
development.
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END NOTES
1 The authors are the Minister and his technical 
adviser. From here onwards the term ‘the Ministry’ 
is used, rather than its full title or long acronym 
(MDNKOAL).
2   Sessional Paper No. 8 of 2012 on the National Policy 
for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya 
and other Arid Lands.
3   These networks included the Kenya Pastoralist 
Forum, the Pastoralist Thematic Group and the 
Pastoral Parliamentary Group. Their activities were 
supported by both state and non-state 
organisations, including the government’s Arid 
Lands Resource Management Project (ALRMP) and 
a number of national and international NGOs. 
4   The first part of this section draws on Ochieng 
Odhiambo, 2012.
5   Casual references to models pursued by countries 
such as Botswana or Israel, which also have 
substantial livestock populations or dryland areas, 
tended to ignore the full costs of those models, 
such as the hardships experienced by poorer 
pastoralists and hunter-gatherers in Botswana 
(Cullis and Watson, 2005), and to undervalue Kenya’s 
rangelands (Barrow and Mogaka, 2007; Behnke and 
Muthami, 2011).
6  These include the principles governing public 
finance (Article 201), the allocation of a minimum 
budget threshold to the new devolved counties 
(Article 203.2), the Equalisation Fund (Article 204) 
and various affirmative action measures (for 
example, Article 56).
7   For example, both the Stock Theft and Produce Act 
of 1933, which provided for collective punishment, 
and the Indemnity Act of 1970, which protected 
members of the security forces from the 
consequences of their actions in the north, were 
still on the statute book when the Ministry was 
created in 2008. A number of discriminatory 
administrative regulations were also in place, such 
as those governing access to ID cards or the 
requirement that any flight to the north required 
permission from the police. At that time there was 
also no high court or land registry in any part of the 
north.
8  The term is used in Kenya Vision 2030, the national 
development plan. The plan is structured around 
a number of these foundations and three pillars: 
economic, social and political. The Ministry’s use of 
the word ‘foundations’ was deliberate, in order to 
echo the discourse of national development 
planning.
9   The emphasis on infrastructure and services in the 
policy documents should not be interpreted as a 
bias in favour of either settled populations or 
livelihoods other than pastoralism. The absence of 
these basic foundations undermines all livelihood 
systems, including pastoralism, particularly given 
the latter’s evolution under the impact of processes 
of commercialization and differentiation. The 
challenge is how to ensure the provision of 
infrastructure and services in ways which are in 
harmony with nomadic systems.
10   Section 1 discusses the historical challenges to 
citizenship in northern Kenya. 
11   Approximately US$375m, using an exchange rate 
of US$1 = Kshs. 80. The large size of the budget 
estimate was because the investments required 
were generally high cost (such as road construction) 
and because of the depth of the region’s neglect.  
12 Approximately US$10.4m.
13  This was the Arid Lands Resource Management 
Project, financed jointly by the government and 
the World Bank.
14 The Economic Stimulus Programme announced in 
the 2009 and subsequent budgets, for example, 
proposed the allocation of equal resources to each 
constituency, regardless of need. This was 
erroneously presented as a form of ‘equitable 
development’ (GoK, 2009), but it ignores the 
significant differences in operating context across 
Kenya. As an illustration: to immunise a child in one 
of Nairobi’s informal settlements may cost only a 
fraction of what is required in a remote county with 
poor infrastructure and a predominantly mobile 
population.
15 The most notorious example of this during the 
Ministry’s tenure was in May/June 2009, when the 
President authorised an increase of Kshs. 5bn in the 
Ministry’s development budget for the coming year. 
Despite a chain of subsequent instructions to this 
effect from the Head of the Public Service, the 
Minister for Finance and the latter’s Permanent 
Secretary, officials lower down the hierarchy in 
Treasury chose not to act. 
16 Conyers (2007) makes a similar argument with 
regard to decentralisation, arguing that its 
weaknesses are a function of broader problems of 
governance.
17 This included an initial consultation meeting in 
March 2009, another on the ASAL policy in February 
2010 and two forums on the Constitution in July 
and October 2011.
18 The Enhanced Livelihoods in the Mandera Triangle 
(ELMT) project was part of the Regional Enhanced 
Livelihoods for Pastoralist Areas (RELPA) programme, 
funded by USAID and implemented by CARE.
19 One example was prior to the annual roundtable 
between government and development partners 
in 2012, when it became clear that ASAL concerns 
– including that of drought resilience, which at the 
time was highly topical – had been overlooked in 
the agenda. Development partners’ submissions 
lent clear backing for the Ministry’s successful 
presentation of an ASAL sector note.
20 The Christensen Fund, for example, which supports 
biological and cultural diversity.
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21  In a meeting on 3 August 2011.
22  A recent publication by Chatham House on drought 
early warning and early action, for example, wrongly 
described the ALRMP as having closed in 2010 due 
to corruption. First, corruption was not proved, and 
second, the project was scheduled to close in that 
year anyway. 
23   One exception was an active network of national 
and international civil society organisations 
engaged in advocacy on NGO legislation.
24   Examples include the Government of Kenya’s 
household budget survey of 2005/06 and 
subsequent constituency poverty analysis (RoK, 
2007); ReSAKSS research on the potential of the 
livestock sector in North-Eastern Province 
(Rakotoarisoa et al, 2008); and Behnke/Muthami 
(2011) on the contribution of livestock to the 
Kenyan economy, produced in collaboration with 
the National Bureau of Statistics.
25   Earlier drafts had, however, been reviewed in detail 
by technocrats in the line ministries.
26   Historically, Kenya has tended to look west and 
south, to the East African Community, for regional 
trade and cooperation, overlooking the possibilities 
across its northern and eastern borders.
27   ‘Infrastructural development, planning and 
encouragement of townships along main roads, 
livestock development, livestock industries, water 
supply, natural resources management, mineral 
resources exploration and development, tourism 
development, human resources development, 
irrigation development, and tapping of solar and 
wind energy’ (Presidential Circular No. 1/2008).
28   An initiative by the Prime Minister’s office to 
strengthen ASAL coordination in 2010 failed 
because of the information constraints discussed 
in section 3. Approval of the Cabinet coordination 
structures was secured only towards the end of the 
Ministry’s lifetime. The ASAL Secretariat was 
established on an informal basis in 2010 but has 
not yet been adequately formalised. The ASAL 
Stakeholder Forum held its first meeting in July 
2012.
29   The Ministry needed civil servants with a deep 
knowledge of the region. Unfortunately this was 
not something prioritised by the centrally driven 
and inflexible recruitment process, such that it was 
allocated officers whose understanding of the 
ASALs was variable. Some civil servants made an 
exceptional effort to get on top of their new brief, 
but this was due to their own initiative rather than 
something which the human resource system 
deliberately fostered.
30   Information provided by the Rural Electrification 
Authority in August 2011.
31  Data generated by the line ministries was 
complemented by other research such as the 
annual assessments of learning outcomes 
conducted by UWEZO.
32   One example is the Health Sector Performance 
Report, July 2009 – June 2010.
33 An example of this was a World Bank conference 
on agriculture and infrastructure in early 2009, 
which also discussed agricultural areas solely in 
terms of crop production, overlooking the 
contribution of livestock.
34 See, for example: ‘Only peace and railways can break 
the cycle of hunger in the Horn’, The East African, 
1-7 August 2011. See also the presentation by the 
IGAD Executive Secretary to Kenya’s permanent 
secretaries on 6 April 2009 (http://www.igad.int/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=142:executive-secretary-briefs-the-permanent-
secretaries-of-kenya&catid=46:executive-
secretary&Itemid=123, accessed 12 April 2013).  
35 See footnote 8.
36 The framework for Action Against Hunger developed 
by the Ministry of State for Special Programmes in 
June 2006, for example, lists ten ministries which 
are ‘most directly involved and relevant’ in tackling 
food insecurity. The list is dominated by those 
within the agriculture sector, the only additions 
being the Ministries of Health and Trade.
37 Some of the legal impediments are mentioned in 
footnote 7.
38 Marsabit is 70,961km2 and Muranga is 2,559km2
39   Technical capacity in arid and pastoral areas is often 
lower than required given poor educational 
achievement (due to chronic under-investment) 
and the reluctance of public officers to be posted 
there. Central ministries also have a tendency to 
post their most junior and inexperienced officers 
to the most difficult areas.
40 IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability 
Initiative (IDDRSI).
41 Key partners will include the Kenya Livestock 
Marketing Council and the Community Owned 
Financial Initiative (COFI). The latter is the first 
sharia-compliant savings and credit cooperative 
(SACCO) in Kenya and was launched in December 
2012.
42 Ministry of Reclamation and Development of Arid, 
Semi-Arid and Wastelands
43 There were, of course, many projects in the ASALs 
prior to the Arid Lands Resource Management 
Project, but none with the latter’s dominance, 
particularly on the national stage. For a helpful 
summary, see Moris, 1999.
44 Ministry of State for Special Programmes
45   Ministry of State for Development of Northern 
Kenya and other Arid Lands
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46 The actual situation is more messy than presented 
here, with multiple narratives overlapping and 
competing (Ochieng Odhiambo, 2012). For 
example, the ‘security/containment’ narrative is still 
present today, although less dominant than during 
the state of emergency and now co-existing with 
other narratives. 
47 Sources: 1a) Kenya National Adult Literacy Survey, 
2007; Ministry of Education, 2012; 1b) Demographic 
and Health Survey, 2008-09; 1c) UNICEF Kenya, 
2011; 1d) Kenya National Human Development 
Report, 2009; 1e) UWEZO Annual Learning 
Assessment, 2011
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Annex 3: Timeline of ASAL policy development
Date Activity 
July 2003 ALRMP initiates a review of the 1992 draft policy framework developed 
by the MRDASW, with support from UNDP and Acacia Consultants. Inter-
ministerial Task Force established.
9–10 December 2003 National policy formulation workshop.
February 2005 Regional consultations.
April/May 2005 Sessional Paper ready for presentation to Cabinet.
January 2006 Revised policy produced and circulated.
2007 DFID provides support to the policy formulation process including a 
consultation meeting with MPs.
April 2008 Creation of MDNKOAL.
August–December 2008 MDNKOAL hosts consultation meetings across the region.
2009 Vision 2030 development strategy for Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands 
formulated with support from RECONCILE. Draft ASAL policy document 
of 2007 revised and shared widely with external stakeholders.
December 2009 Consultation meeting with MPs.
February 2010 Consultation meetings with elders (through Pastoral Shade) and with 
development partners. Comments incorporated from line ministries.
March 2010 Policy documents submitted to the Cabinet Office.
August 2010 Policy documents re-submitted to the Cabinet Office.
January 2011 Policy documents revised in light of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, and 
re-submitted to the Cabinet Office in June 2011.
11 October 2012 Policy documents passed by Cabinet.
6 December 2012 Sessional Paper passed by Parliament.
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